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Academic Duty and Academic Freedom 
AMY GAJDA* 
On December 31, 1915, the newly formed American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) and its Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure 
accepted a set of guidelines designed to shape the organization and its work to protect 
academics against the termination power of their employer-universities.1 The 
“General Declaration of Principles,”2 drafted by approximately a dozen educators 
who were called from universities across the country,3 begins with a decided focus 
on the rights of individuals within the academy: “The term ‘academic freedom’ has 
traditionally had two applications,” the language reads at the start, “to the freedom 
of the teacher and to that of the student . . . .”4  
With that, in a very real way in the United States, academic freedom began. And 
its very first focus was, not surprisingly, given the authors, on the protection of the 
teacher. 
A century later, on its webpage celebrating 100 years of academic freedom, the 
AAUP quoted with praise what it called a “foundational statement” from the 
Declaration, language that helped exemplify what the concept of academic freedom 
means. “[O]nce appointed,” the seminal language drafted in 1915 and enthusiastically 
republished in 2015 reads, “the scholar has professional functions to perform in which 
the appointing authorities have neither competency nor moral right to intervene. The 
responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself, and to the 
judgment of his own profession.”5  
As its membership consisting mostly of faculty members6 recognizes, the AAUP 
exists in strong part to protect a scholar’s academic pursuits,7 and academic freedom, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. Thanks to Steve Sanders for the 
invitation to be a part of this symposium and for his inspiring work. Thanks too to the editors 
of the Indiana Law Journal who, after their careful edits, made this piece decidedly better. 
 1. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 BULL. AM. 
ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 15 (1915). 
 2. Id. at 20. 
 3. Id. at 17. 
 4. Id. at 20. 
 5. 100 Years of Defending Academic Freedom, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, 
http://www.aaup.org/about/centennial/100-years-defending-academic-freedom [http://perma.cc
/YH3L-6X9K] (quoting Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 
26). 
 6. See Membership, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/membership 
(inviting “faculty members, academic professionals, and graduate students” to join). 
 7. In addition to strong language regarding the promotion of faculty members’ academic 
freedom—in a self-description the AAUP maintains, for example, that its first “mission . . . is 
to advance academic freedom”—the organization also suggests that it encourages “shared 
governance,” giving faculty members a greater voice on campuses, and the promotion of the 
“economic security of faculty.” About the AAUP, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, www.aaup.org
/about-aaup [http://perma.cc/8R5J-LVZ9]. “[T]here are still people who want to control what 
professors teach and write,” the AAUP website explained in July 2015, suggesting that the 
organization exists to assist those professors who are fighting such battles. Id. 
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by name, is literally at the very beginning of its principles and, therefore, was at its 
heart at its very inception. That freedom, put in the context of moral rights a century 
ago by the AAUP and its Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 
would some fifty years later be soundly tethered to the Constitution by the United 
States Supreme Court when the Justices wrote that academic freedom was “a special 
concern of the First Amendment.”8 
Today, then, those in academia have certain freedoms sparked by language 
drafted 100 years ago and embraced in a significant way by the courts and, therefore, 
necessarily by campuses across the nation. Academic freedom has come to mean, as 
the drafters of the AAUP report hoped it would, the freedom to research and write 
without significant restrictions from administrators or outside influences.9 
What is less noted about the 1915 foundational language, however, is its second 
part: the suggestion that the responsibility of the university professor is not only to 
his or her academic peers but also, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, “primarily to the 
public itself.”10  
This essay considers that language and language like it from the “General 
Declaration of Principles” within the context of today’s nascent threat to academic 
freedom that comes from some courts and otherwise. It first explores Declaration 
language that urges upon scholars a “duty” of public education, language that notes 
the importance of the public perception of the academy, and language that suggests 
that academic freedom is tied at least in part to how the public perceives its scholars.11 
Second, it collects some example cases that provide some evidence of a judicial shift 
away from an embrace of scholarly academic freedom, suggesting that, just as the 
Declaration warned, as colleges and universities became more businesslike, or as the 
public begins to perceive them in that way, those on the outside of academia became 
less enamored with academic freedom-based arguments.12 Finally, it suggests that a 
small return to forgotten points within the Declaration of Principles through a 
renewed focus on the service component of the tenure, promotion, and annual review 
of academic dossiers could provide a larger return to the scholarly community.13 
This is, it appears, what the authors from a century ago suggested was necessary 
for the advancement of academic freedom in the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 9. Consider, as just one example, the written policy on academic freedom at Indiana 
University. There, faculty members are given wide berth inside and outside the classroom: 
“No limitation shall be placed upon the teacher’s and librarian’s freedom of exposition of the 
subject in the classroom, or library, or on the expression of it outside,” one of the sentences 
reads. Academic Freedom: Policy Statement, IND. U., http://policies.iu.edu/policies
/categories/academic-faculty-students/conditions-academic-employment/Academic-Freedom
.shtml [http://perma.cc/7LW9-R5LT]. 
 10. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 26. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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I. ACADEMIC FREEDOM COMES WITH A WARNING 
In 1915, eleven separate incidents involving perceived infringements of academic 
freedom arose on United States campuses from the West Coast to the East.14 Those 
eleven cases and the apparently wronged academics at their centers helped spark the 
formation of the American Association of University Professors. That organization, 
in turn, published its General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure, a document drafted by approximately a dozen scholars from 
colleges and universities across the nation, a document meant to help explain what 
academic freedom meant, why it was important, and how academics could help 
further it.15 A paragraph published as part of the report’s preface sums up its overall 
purpose both succinctly and expectedly:  
The safeguarding of a proper measure of academic freedom in American 
universities requires both a clear understanding of the principles which 
bear upon the matter, and the adoption by the universities of such 
arrangements and regulations as may effectually prevent any 
infringement of that freedom and deprive of plausibility all charges of 
such infringement.16 
The authors described their report as one that contained both a general declaration 
of academic freedom principles—“freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of 
teaching . . . and freedom of extra-mural utterance and action”17—and what they 
called “practical proposals,” those recommendations that they deemed “necessary” 
to place American universities upon a “satisfactory footing” to safeguard academic 
freedom.18 
Not surprisingly, the language that the committee used regarding the principles of 
academic freedom parallels what many in the academy believe today:19 that academic 
freedom means the “advance[ment] [of] knowledge by the unrestricted research and 
unfettered discussion of impartial investigators.”20 As do many modern-day 
academics who write about academic freedom,21 the report lauds “[g]enuine boldness 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 18. 
 15. Id. at 19. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 20. 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. See, e.g., Robert Post, Discipline and Freedom in the Academy, 65 ARK. L. REV. 203, 
205 (2012) (“Properly understood, academic freedom safeguards a scholar's capacity 
competently to perform her scholarship. It seeks to ensure that faculty will not be penalized 
for their scholarship, except on grounds of incompetence or material malfeasance. And it also 
requires that the competence of scholarship must be evaluated by scholars rather than by lay 
persons.”). 
 20. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 22. 
 21. See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 44 (2009) (“Academic freedom is the price the 
public must pay in return for the social good of advancing knowledge.”); Susan N. Gary, The 
Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right Thing, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1032 (2010) (suggesting that “[a] university will be unwilling to 
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and thoroughness of inquiry, and freedom of speech” within the academy, finding 
that such flourishing intellectual vitality is “scarcely reconcilable” and contrasts 
markedly with the more restrictive institutions that “prescribe[] inculcation of a 
particular opinion upon a controverted question.”22  
Education and the academic freedom that is necessary to produce it, the report 
concludes, are “the corner stone of the structure of society.”23 That language is not 
surprising, given the educators who wrote the document, the cases involving 
academic freedom that were pending at the time, and the organization for which the 
language was written. 
Perhaps somewhat less expectedly, however, additional language within the 
report, language explored with specificity later in this Part, suggests that academics 
who are protected by academic freedom in turn owe a duty not just to those within 
their institutions and those within their particular scholarly fields, but also to 
members of the general public: as noted earlier, the authors suggest quite specifically 
that those within academia owe a duty to those decidedly on the outside. In effect, 
therefore, as it drafted the report, the committee seemed almost as concerned with 
the public perception of the academy—and, at times, seemingly with academics’ 
sharing of information with the public in general—as it was with the ideal of 
academic freedom itself. In that way, and at multiple points within the document, the 
authors linked the promise of academic freedom protections with the way the public 
perceives the academy and repeatedly suggested that the academy must recognize 
the importance of the public perception of its academic work, or academic freedom 
itself will falter.  
As noted in a later Part, this is not an ideal embraced with much fervor on college 
campuses today.24 
Yet, there are multiple examples of a linkage between public duty and academic 
freedom both explicit and inherent in the 1915 document. One example is the 
language quoted and credited by the AAUP in 2015—that the responsibility of the 
professor is “primarily to the public itself.”25 A second example comes later and links 
the professor’s, and essentially the entire university’s, sharing of information with 
public accountability: “[I]n the essentials of [the university teacher’s] professional 
activity,” the report reads, “his duty is to the wider public to which the institution 
itself is morally amenable.”26 The authors even more explicitly suggest that an 
academic’s duties include the free sharing of information with those outside the 
institution’s gates: a professor’s function, the report reads at one point, is “to impart 
the results of [his] own and of [his] fellow-specialists’ investigations and reflection, 
both to students and to the general public, without fear or favor.”27  
                                                                                                                 
 
consider donor restrictions that infringe on academic freedom by permitting a donor to make 
decisions about faculty hiring or curricular development”). 
 22. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 22.  
 23. Id. at 24. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, supra Note 5 (quoting Comm. on Academic Freedom & 
Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 26). 
 26. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1, at 26. 
 27. Id. at 25. 
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Later, it describes such sharing of academic work and involvement in public 
education as key to teaching American citizens in general to be more circumspect 
and self-critical28 and as a “correlative obligation[]” linked to the professor’s own 
academic freedom.29 
In addition to language that stresses the academy’s moral obligation to share 
knowledge more generally, therefore, the report seems to link academic freedom 
protections with public engagement and the public perception of the academy. Here, 
it suggests that academic freedom is buoyed by such public interactions and that one 
falters without the other. Moreover, the report’s authors decidedly warn that if the 
public begins to doubt the truthfulness of academic information—or, better put, to 
doubt whether academic teachers and researchers are indeed speaking the truth—that 
institutions of higher education will be in trouble more generally. Such a trust-based 
scenario, one in which the public believes in the integrity of its academics, is “highly 
needful,”30 the report maintains. “[O]ur universities shall be so free,” it argues, “that 
no fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a suspicion that the utterances 
of university teachers are shaped or restricted by the judgment, not of professional 
scholars, but of inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested persons outside of 
their ranks.”31 
There is even more direct suggestion in the report that, without such sharing and 
without such trust, academic freedom itself is in peril: “To the degree that 
professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation of their opinions, are, or by 
the character of their tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than their own 
scientific conscience and a desire for the respect of their fellow-experts,” the report 
reads, “to that degree the university teaching profession is corrupted; its proper 
influence upon public opinion is diminished and vitiated; and society at large fails to 
get from its scholars, in an unadulterated form, the peculiar and necessary service 
which it is the office of the professional scholar to furnish.”32 
The report, therefore, links two ideals—scholars’ freedom of academic inquiry 
and the community’s perception of that inquiry—with the flourishing of academic 
freedom itself. 
Finally, and arguably with some prescience, just under the section poetically titled 
“[t]he nature of the academic calling,”33 the authors suggest that as universities 
become more businesslike or are seen by the greater public that way, the reputation 
of the academy and academic freedom itself will suffer: a “conception of a university 
as an ordinary business venture, and of academic teaching as a purely private 
employment, manifests also a radical failure to apprehend the nature of the social 
function discharged by the professional scholar,” the report reads.34 Instead, the 
authors believed, it was “to the public interest” that the professoriate maintains its 
dignity and its independence on campuses free and apart from the universities’ more 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Id. at 32–33. 
 29. Id. at 33. 
 30. Id. at 25. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 25–26. 
 33. Id. at 24. 
 34. Id. 
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pecuniary interests.35 Reinforcing the idea of public trust, society must believe, the 
authors wrote, that scholarly conclusions are, in fact, “the conclusions of men trained 
for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth,” and not conclusions that merely parrot that 
of the public or of the university administration or its benefactors.36 And the 
university’s responsibility “as a whole,” therefore, should not be to its financial 
interests, but to “the community at large.”37 
In other words, the authors suggest that the university-as-a-business model, one 
in which professors are seen as mouthpieces of the university and its trustees, or of 
its financial interests, or of industry, threatens the progress of knowledge and, to 
them, the essentials of civilization.38  
But they also suggest that the perception of the university as a business is a major 
threat to the academy and its freedoms as well. 
Recall the authors’ initial introductory point that “[t]he safeguarding of a proper 
measure of academic freedom in American universities requires . . . a clear 
understanding of the principles which bear upon the matter.”39 One of the principles 
the authors apparently believed strongly related to the robustness of academic 
freedom, then, is a free professoriate working within a vibrant university, untethered 
by outside business-related concerns—but also one with a literal duty, apparently a 
paramount duty, to share freely and truthfully its expertise with those outside 
academia’s ivied walls. 
II. PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND A NASCENT EROSION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
In 2009, Stanley Fish reviewed my book The Trials of Academe on the website of 
the New York Times.40 The book focused on academic freedom and argued that there 
had been a dangerous eroding of the public and judicial embrace of the concept, one 
that could well end familiar protections on which academics and universities rely.41 
The anti-academia responses by the New York Times readers were decidedly in line 
with my thesis: 
Academics have cushy jobs they don’t perform.42 
They use bait-and-switch tactics to lure students.43 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 25. 
 37. Id. at 29. 
 38. Id. at 24–25. 
 39. Id. at 19. 
 40. Stanley Fish, The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR, 
(Oct. 12, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/the-rise-and
-fall-of-academic-abstinence/?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/78VB-FNSQ]. 
 41. AMY GAJDA, THE TRIALS OF ACADEME: THE NEW ERA OF CAMPUS LITIGATION (2009).  
 42. Stanley Fish, Academics Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR, (October 19, 2009, 
9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/academics-under-siege/?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/5W7K-E9TG] (describing the “general sense” of readers’ comments to Fish, 
supra note 40). 
 43. Melissa, Comment to The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR, (Oct. 12, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12
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Now it’s time to move on to doing away with this tenure stupidity.44  
Used car salespeople have better standards.45 
Fish described the comments by these New York Times readers in the aggregate: 
“[A]lmost no one had a good thing to say” about academics or academic freedom.46  
This same negative response to academia and academic freedom can be seen in 
some judicial opinions and legislative enactments that have come over the course of 
the last few years; powerful outsiders have started to scrutinize the ivory towers of 
academia and to reject what academics argue is their freedom to do as they wish on 
campus and in the classroom. As one veteran university counsel suggested in 2006, 
“What is new and different today is the aggressiveness with which courts and 
legislatures intrude in academic decisions as fundamental as the selection of students, 
the awarding of scholarships, and the determination of curriculum.”47 “Ours is the 
era of judges and legislators who routinely second-guess decisions with which they 
disagree,” he added, “even if it means substituting their own views for the considered 
judgments of educational professionals.”48  
As that description of the current state of higher education–based jurisprudence 
and legislation implies, such careful scrutiny and rejection of academic decisions is 
quite different from the way it used to be. In the past, flowery language very much 
in line with that in the 1915 report protected academia and its academic 
determinations. A federal court recently compiled various snippets of historic 
academic deference language (even as the court scrutinized, in a twenty-five page 
opinion, the merits of a student’s claims springing from his academic dismissal based 
on poor grades and what the school suggested was the student’s lack of 
professionalism and interpersonal skills): 
Thus “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely 
academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s 
judgment.” “University faculties must have the widest range of 
discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of 
students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation.” “A graduate 
or professional school is, after all, the best judge of its students’ academic 
performance and their ability to master the required curriculum.” 




 44. Victor Edwards, Comment to The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR, (Oct. 12, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/the
-rise-and-fall-of-academic-abstinence/comment-page-1/ [http://perma.cc/WQS8-7HXX]. 
 45. AI, Comment to The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR, (Oct. 12, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10
/12/the-rise-and-fall-of-academic-abstinence/comment-page-2/#respond [http://perma.cc/FGN5
-9M45]. 
 46. Fish, supra note 42. 
 47. Lawrence White, Judicial Threats to Academe’s ‘Four Freedoms’, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Dec. 1, 2006, at B6, B7. 
 48. Id. at B6–B7. 
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“[C]ourts are reluctant to interfere with academic evaluations, 
particularly at the higher educational levels.”49 
It synthesized such precedent as guidance to judges, so that they would know to 
show “extreme deference” to academia.50 All this, the court noted, quoting the United 
States Supreme Court, because “[c]onsiderations of profound importance counsel 
restrained judicial review of the substance of academic decisions.”51   
Much of that quoted and paraphrased language from courts, however, including 
that from the Supreme Court, was written decades before 2014, at a time when the 
public perception of universities was more in line with that of the professors who had 
drafted the 1915 report on academic freedom.52 
Today, as the veteran university counsel quoted earlier suggests, multiple state 
and federal courts across the nation have readily scrutinized academic decision 
making in a way that affects, at least in part, the academic freedom of the institution 
and its individual professors. Two fairly recent and remarkable examples follow. 
After a disagreement at Vanderbilt University, in which a professor convincingly 
argued that a student had cheated on a test by changing responses on an answer sheet 
after it had been returned to the student, the federal appellate court hearing the 
student’s resulting claim rejected the argument that such a determination was an 
academic matter best left to the university.53 The student, who had maintained 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Shah v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Sch., 54 F. Supp. 3d 681, 697 (N.D. Tex. 2014) 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 700. 
 51. Id. at 697 (alteration in original) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).  
 52. Just after the turn of the twentieth century and, therefore, at the time the AAUP 
committee authored its report on academic freedom, business, as one example, had decidedly 
started to embrace the idea of higher education and to require a formal education of potential 
employees; this was a shift from the late 1800s when many had looked more skeptically at 
what higher education offered. DAVID O. LEVINE, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND THE CULTURE 
OF ASPIRATION, 1915–1940, at 54 (1986). “The businessman of the 1920s believed that higher 
education provided a perspective that was not only helpful but necessary.” Id. Levine noted 
that the shift came especially after World War I, id. at 45, and that more parents, not just upper 
class parents, especially began to embrace the importance of higher education at that same 
time, id. at 56. By 1921, a survey showed a “progressive dependence” upon higher education. 
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Later, the “golden age” of higher 
education dawned just after World War II, a time in which higher education was even more 
decidedly thought to be a “public good” and in which colleges and universities were 
institutions in the public interest that were destined to better society. Robert Kiener, Future of 
Public Universities, in ISSUES FOR DEBATE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 197, 211 (14th ed. 
2014). It was during this golden age that Supreme Court Justices would celebrate the 
“essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities” and warn that “our 
civilization will stagnate and die” without vibrant academic freedom in higher education. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).  
 53. Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App’x 246, 255 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The district court 
held that dismissal of Atria’s breach of contract claim was necessary because a federal court 
is an inappropriate forum in which to challenge academic matters. We disagree with the district 
court’s characterization of this claim as one challenging academic matters.”). 
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initially that the form had been accidentally smudged54 and then that not he, but a 
jealous classmate, had altered his answer sheet in the hopes of setting the student up 
for a misconduct investigation, had sued the professor and the university.55 The student 
argued that by leaving the graded exams accessible to everyone in the class, the 
professor had acted negligently by creating a situation ripe for scheming 
misdeed-doers.56 Over the university’s argument that such inquiry into the professor’s 
academic judgment and into its own internal determination that the student had acted 
wrongly was inappropriate, the court ruled that, instead, jurors should decide whether 
the professor’s method of handing back exams was reasonable or not.57 The federal 
trial court had initially decided that a courtroom was “an inappropriate forum in 
which to challenge academic matters,”58 but the appeals court very clearly 
disagreed.59 
A second striking example involves a Florida medical student who sued his 
university after it dismissed him for failing a required clinical program because of 
alleged unprofessional conduct with patients and otherwise.60 There, courts 
repeatedly decided that the student had a valid claim against the university for what 
was, in effect, breach of contract based upon language in a university publication that 
suggested that a student’s studies would continue without interruption. There, the 
student eventually won millions of dollars from a jury, both for his trouble and for 
the salary he would have earned had he been awarded the degree that he had been 
denied.61 One of the judges hearing one of multiple appeals in the case wrote 
explicitly that judicial deference to universities was no longer in line with 
contemporary values and that businesslike motivations of universities were in part to 
blame for the shift in legal outcome: “[T]he deeply rooted . . . judicial deference to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Id. at 249–50. 
 55. Id. at 250. 
 56. Id. at 251. 
 57. Id. at 251–52. 
 58. Id. at 255. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Sharick v. Se. Univ. of the Health Scis., Inc., 780 So. 2d 142, 146 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (Levy, J., dissenting in denial of reh’g) (“Sharick’s inappropriate conduct that led 
to his dismissal is a factor that the jury should consider when determining whether Sharick 
would have become employed and in what capacity. Specifically, the record indicates that 
Sharick was dismissed because he: (1) ‘was apparently unable to identify very fundamental 
signs and symptoms of diabetes mellititus’; (2) ‘failed to examine the abdomen and suprapubic 
area of a woman complaining of lower abdominal pain and presenting with symptoms of a 
urinary tract infection’; (3) ‘raised the skirt of a female patient without informing her that [he 
was] going to do so’; and (4) ‘consistently failed to review charts properly prior to interacting 
with these patients.’”). 
 61. There are multiple decisions arising from the dispute, including claims brought by the 
student against his university, by the student against his original attorney, and by the university 
after the decision awarding the student future earnings. See, e.g., Nova Se. Univ. of the Health 
Scis., Inc. v. Sharick, 21 So. 3d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Sharick v. Se. Univ. of the 
Health Scis., Inc., 891 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Sharick v. Se. Univ. of the Health 
Scis., Inc., 780 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
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university conduct toward students becomes increasingly less defensible as 
bottom-line, commercial concerns motivate university actions . . . .”62 
Such financially driven behavior by academic institutions, the judge suggested, 
decidedly conflicted with what had been longstanding judicial deference to academia 
and academic decisions—and made a university’s academic freedom-based 
arguments increasingly groundless.63 Today, the judge suggested, “higher education 
is both a product and a relationship that begs for external review.”64 
There are additional examples that suggest that courts are considerably less 
accommodating to academia today. A federal trial court in Washington, D.C., in 
2012, for example, noted as it refused to dismiss a student’s case based on grades 
and performance that a school’s determination that academic standards have not been 
met is usually given deference, but not always.65 A Wisconsin appeals court similarly 
rejected a university’s academic deference argument in a case involving a student’s 
dismissal from dental school based in part on poor grades.66 The school had argued 
that it had made the decision to dismiss the student “honestly and with integrity,” but 
the court was unpersuaded.67 And a federal court in New Jersey ruled that a student’s 
claim for negligence involving an alleged grade point average miscalculation should 
continue, noting that earlier courts had only condemned “day to day” review of 
grading decisions and that “outside of that limited context,” universities could still 
be found negligent for failing to follow their own grading procedures.68 
Even when courts have ultimately decided in favor of professors and their 
universities in grading disputes and otherwise, the analysis at times is far deeper than 
instantly deferential. A federal trial court in Oklahoma, for example, ordered a law 
school to produce all students’ exam answers from a law school course so that the 
plaintiff-student could compare her fellow students’ answers with her own in an 
effort to prove that she had been given an unfair grade by her professor.69 Meanwhile, 
a court in Alabama wrote a pithy sentence in response to a student’s grading 
complaint—that “[h]ow teachers grade . . . is one of those pedagogical concerns that 
are at the heart of the teaching profession”70—in a case that the court described as 
“an effort by a student to get judicial review of her academic performance,”71 but 
that breezily dismissive comment was on page ten of a thirteen-page opinion. And a 
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federal trial court in Indiana ultimately dismissed a student’s discrimination claim 
based on a grade that the student had received in an English composition course, but 
not before undertaking a comparison of the various projects the professor at issue 
had assigned, the class syllabus and its precise language, the grades the professor had 
given other students, and the student’s own grades and attendance record.72  
Indeed, in 2012, when the Ninth Circuit heard a discrimination case brought by 
a PhD student against her university after her dissertation advisor withdrew from 
any advising capacity, the worry by some on the bench about an erosion of 
academic freedom and its impact on universities was striking.73 The appellate panel 
had allowed the student’s discrimination claim to go forward on what was 
described as “no evidence”74 and the plaintiff’s own “vague description of what 
someone else said during a conversation with a third party,”75 and, in response, 
seven of the Ninth Circuit judges in a dissent from a denial of en banc review 
suggested that academic freedom was clearly at stake in the case.76 The decision to 
move the student’s claim forward, the dissenting judges wrote, “jeopardizes 
academic freedom by making it far too easy for students to bring retaliation claims 
against their professors,”77 a situation they described as a “very, very bad result 
[and a] major misapplication of long-standing legal principles to the sensitive area 
of academia.”78 The dissenters continued: “If this ill-considered precedent stands, 
professors will have to think twice before giving honest evaluations of their 
students for fear that disgruntled students may haul them into court. This is a loss 
for professors and students and for society, which depends on their creative 
ferment.”79 
The Ninth Circuit, the seven dissenting judges argued, had suddenly made it far 
too easy for students to sue their professors when, in fact, in the dissenting judges’ 
minds, the pleading standards should be “highest” or most protective of the 
defendant academic in such cases to protect academia and the good that it does for 
society.80 
As a final example, in 2013, when a federal trial court in New Jersey 
preliminarily upheld a claim by Widener University School of Law graduates that 
the school’s employment statistics had misled them about the viability of their law 
degrees in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA),81 the court 
again put the student-institution relationship in decidedly economic terms. “Here,” 
the court wrote in finding the potential for consumer fraud and in rejecting 
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decisions from other states that had refused to do so,82 “[p]laintiffs made a purchase 
from [the law school], an enterprise in the business of providing a legal education. 
. . . [and] charging significant sums to teach [p]laintiffs the practice of law.”83  
Consider that language, describing higher education as a business precisely like 
a corner store and its students as consumers buying the product of education, 
against the language used in 1915 to describe academia: a place unlike any other, 
and certainly not a business, with the goal of advancing societal knowledge through 
unfettered discussion,84 “the corner stone of the structure of society,” with a unique 
and dignified quest for truth and knowledge.85 Consider, too, how different the 
conception of higher education as a commodity is from the Supreme Court’s 
language from half a century before that referred to the “essentiality of freedom in 
the community of American universities” and maintained that academic freedom 
was an “area[] in which government should be extremely reticent to tread” because 
of the “vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our 
youth.”86  
What is different today, at least in part, then, as suggested by university counsel 
and judges both implicitly and explicitly, is the decidedly business focus of 
universities. For good or ill, it is easy to see why, especially to outsiders, today’s 
universities seem increasingly like a corner store or, perhaps more aptly put, a 
major corporation.  
The numbers seem to suggest the latter, especially with regard to 
university-affiliated business ventures. Consider, for example, product development, 
admittedly one way in which universities ultimately share research with the public, 
albeit often covertly. In 2009 alone, for example, universities licensed more than 600 
new products and started nearly 600 new companies—most, of course, the products 
of faculty members and their research interests.87 More recently, in 2013, 
universities reportedly had filed more than 24,000 individual new patent 
applications, up 11% from the previous year,88 and in 2014, the head of a national 
university licensing organization suggested that there had been a “phenomenal . . . 
one-year jump in the number of new commercial products” introduced by 
universities: 965 new items were introduced that year, a jump of 34% from a year 
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before.89 The sales revenue from such products in 2014 was put at $28 billion.90 
Meantime, government money received by universities for research projects was 
said to be $25 billion, with $76 billion of federal money spent on higher education 
overall.91 Such income, in addition to significant support from the private sector, 
helped to put many colleges on what, to an outsider, would seem to be solid 
financial footing. In 2015, the forty wealthiest colleges were reported to have 
endowments and cash of more than $6 billion each, while the rest had a median of 
$273 million.92 During this same period, the AAUP warned that universities had 
suddenly become interested in ownership of copyrights awarded to individual 
faculty members, calling this increasing interest in intellectual property a “sea 
change” based upon universities’ businesslike interests.93 Such a shift, the AAUP 
suggested, had made faculty members “no different from those working in 
for-profit corporations that exist for the benefit of investors.”94  
At the same time that this new money was flowing in, tuition costs for students 
generally continued to rise. According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics, the cost of attending a college or university rose considerably in a 
ten-year period: 
For the 2012–13 academic year, annual current dollar prices for 
undergraduate tuition, room, and board were estimated to be $15,022 at 
public institutions, $39,173 at private nonprofit institutions, and $23,158 
at private for-profit institutions. Between 2002–03 and 2012–13, prices 
for undergraduate tuition, room, and board at public institutions rose 39 
percent, and prices at private nonprofit institutions rose 27 percent, after 
adjustment for inflation.95 
During this same period, and of interest to students and those paying tuition 
dollars to send students to college, the number of tenured or tenure-track professors 
within colleges and universities—those professors thought to be most able to teach 
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effectively96—had fallen from nearly 80% in 1969 to 33% in 2009.97 “By 2007,” the 
AAUP reported, “almost 70 percent of faculty members were employed off the tenure 
track,” as adjuncts or other, often part-time, contingent positions.98 Such non-tenured 
faculty “generally work at significantly lower wages, often without health coverage 
and other benefits,” the AAUP reported, and often must hold down teaching jobs at 
more than one individual institution; the organization called such a situation 
“subprofessional.”99 In a 2013 article, the New York Times noted directly the curious 
circumstance that a potential for subpar performance in the classroom was occurring 
at a time when tuition costs were rising: 
Adjuncts have also wondered how to rally support from parents, who 
might not have considered how faculty working conditions affect 
students’ learning conditions, or that their huge tuition bills were paying 
for instructors who commute among several universities, have no offices 
and may earn so little that they qualify for food stamps.100 
That language reflects, at least in part, the results of two Pew Research Center 
studies captured in the Center’s 2012 report titled The Future Impact of the Internet 
on Higher Education.101 The studies showed that 60% of American adults believed 
that higher education institutions had had a positive impact on the United States 
(which, of course, suggests that at least a somewhat significant percentage believed 
that the institutions had not), that 75% found the cost of going to college too 
expensive for most, and that 57% believed that “the higher education system in the 
U.S. fails to provide students with good value for the money they and their families 
spend.”102 
Even more relevant here, a 2010 survey done by the National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education and Public Agenda showed that 60% of Americans 
increasingly believe that colleges and universities care less about students today than 
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they did before and that colleges and universities conduct themselves like businesses 
more than ever today; that result marked an increase of eight percentage points in 
dissatisfaction from just three years before.103 Responders, the report suggests, felt 
that colleges and universities were “focused more on the bottom line than on the 
educational experience of students.”104 Surveyors had asked respondents this precise 
question: “Which comes closer to your view—colleges today care mainly about 
education and making sure students have a good educational experience, or colleges 
today are like most businesses and care mainly about the bottom line?”105 Only 32% 
answered that they felt that the statement that “colleges today care mainly about 
education and making sure students have a good educational experience” came 
closest to their view.106 
A website that reports on higher education issues suggested that such overall 
survey numbers showed “public ambivalence about higher education,”107 though the 
latter report seems to indicate that, for most, emotions on the topic run deeper.  
There is, then, at the very least, some measurable sense of public dissatisfaction 
with higher education, proved by language used by courts in recent decisions that 
reject academic freedom-based arguments and in poll numbers that show at least 
skepticism about higher education’s institutional goals. At a time when academic 
freedom as the 1915 Principles envisioned it seems to be eroding in courtrooms, 
many members of the public also seem to be questioning higher education’s 
commitment to education. 
Perhaps, as the authors of the 1915 report suggested one hundred years ago in 
language seemingly linking vibrant academic freedom protections with professors’ 
public interactions, there is some connection between these two negative 
circumstances. The question for colleges and universities and the individual 
academics within them is what to do about it.  
III. A SMALL SUGGESTION FOR A SMALL RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES 
If one is a professor on the tenure track today, one has three main concerns in the 
often seven-year push toward the promise of a lifetime job, otherwise known as 
tenure. In decidedly descending order, they are publishing, teaching, and service.  
That tiered result, certainly of little surprise to most academics, was confirmed in 
a 2009 national survey of political science departments. The study showed that 
“research remains dominant” in tenure considerations generally and, more 
specifically, that “poor teaching may be tolerated at doctoral-granting 
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universities.”108 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, and likely of little surprise to 
students, only 3% of doctoral institutions suggested that teaching was the most 
important factor in a tenure decision, in contrast with the 76% that suggested that 
research was the key.109 Service, it was reported in an overall sense, was “clearly a 
lower priority”110 than either publication or teaching, and only 3% of respondents 
suggested that publishing, teaching, and service were given equal weight in a tenure 
determination.111  
Additional evidence suggests that the same valuation exists not only in political 
science departments but more generally in most academic departments across 
colleges and universities. A 2007 report by the Modern Language Association 
(MLA), for example, found increasing demands on academics for both scholarly 
publications and for teaching quality and quantity, while “service [as an item valued 
by the university] showed the lowest percentage increase in importance . . . and the 
highest decrease in importance.”112 In the meantime, the MLA study showed, 
“demands for [scholarly] publication . . . have been expanding in kind and increasing 
in quantity.”113 The report suggested that valued or tenure-worthy publications 
included university press books and scholarly articles in refereed journals and very 
little else.114  
In other words, many who are up for tenure in a traditional sense at most research 
universities must have portfolios that include at the very least one scholarly book, 
with plans for a second, and several scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals. 
Teaching prowess on many campuses is important, but far less valuable in the eyes 
of a tenure committee than the published word. 
Service, meanwhile, the decidedly least valued of the three criteria for 
tenure115—sometimes described pejoratively at major research universities as a 
check-the-box category for tenure because no one involved in the tenure outcome 
will be truly interested in or care about what service was done116—is defined in 
different ways by different institutions, though it is essentially service to the 
institution and the greater public. A 1993 book titled Getting Tenure117 describes how 
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a scholar might provide evidence of service outside of committee assignments within 
a college or university: “[T]ypical service expectations might be the willingness to 
give presentations on topics of more general public interest related to one’s scholarly 
field of expertise. . . . Other types of more recent service activities are requests for 
appearances on radio talk shows or other media settings.”118 But the authors advise 
budding academics in a way that parallels the national survey results: “Most college 
faculty members do not consider these [examples of outreach] as constituting 
important service, although public relations offices on campus are interested in 
them.”119 
What all this means is that the familiar phrase “publish or perish” is quite 
appropriate advice for those undertaking a career in academia today. That the focus 
is on research to the decided exclusion of service is also relevant to academia’s 
future. The Pew Research Center report on the future of higher education, for 
example, included real concerns about academics’ ability to adapt in the changing 
world of higher education because these scholarly individuals had been raised within 
a campus culture that looked, in effect, most significantly to words on paper that 
would be read by other academics in the same field and not to what happened in the 
classroom or elsewhere.120 Worried expert commentators from campuses across the 
country told the researchers that they doubted the prospect of any significant change 
in response to market forces outside the academy anytime soon, in part because of 
the academy’s decided focus: “[P]rofessors at leading universities are rewarded on 
research, not teaching”121 and “[t]he university is . . . filled with academics whose 
major interests are their own research”122 were two of the comments that supported 
the authors’ contention that “[f]rustration and doubt mark the prospect of change 
within the academy.”123 Some change seems necessary during times in which the 
public seems to have an increasing distrust of higher education’s motives such as 
when a significant majority of Americans believes that academia has its own business 
interests at heart and not the education of its students.124  
And yet, service—including public outreach through talks and nonscholarly 
media publications meant for the general public—continues to have far less value by 
those assessing the portfolios of untenured scholars in order to decide whether those 
scholars should stay forever on that particular campus or find employment elsewhere. 
It is interesting to consider that conflict in light of the language in the 1915 AAUP 
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.125 
Recall the report’s poetic focus on the “nature of the academic calling,” the “dignity 
of the scholar’s profession,” and the importance its authors placed upon imparting 
knowledge beyond the walls of the institution, described within the report as the 
                                                                                                                 
 
SURVIVAL SKILLS FOR SCHOLARS: GETTING TENURE (Mitchell Allen ed., 1993). 
 118. Id. at 117. 
 119. Id. 
 120. ANDERSON ET AL, supra note 101, at 2–3. 
 121. Id. at 25. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 7. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 103.  
 125. Comm. on Academic Freedom & Academic Tenure, supra note 1. 
34 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:17 
 
scholar’s and the university’s “duty . . . to the wider public.”126 Recall, too, the 
report’s contention that if the university looked solely within, either by acting more 
like a business or by failing to reach out to those beyond its walls, academic freedom 
itself would suffer.127 Such a decidedly outward focus was one of the report’s 
“principles relating to academic freedom.”128 
If those authors are right, perhaps even a slight shift back toward the 1915 report’s 
ideals could help change the public perception of academia and could, therefore, 
ultimately help to protect academic freedom. 
It is true that the academic world has changed markedly in the past century, and 
that change has made some of the language in the 1915 report quaint and at times 
awkwardly idealistic. Science has advanced and has become more complex, as have 
the universities that make scientific research possible. Without a decided focus on 
the importance of research and academic publication, the sharing of which allows 
researchers to build upon earlier work, thereby moving knowledge forward, the 
world would not have advanced as much as it has. In that way, many scholars do 
indeed share their work with the public. Even the authors of the 1915 report 
recognized the value of a research focus within a university and the importance of 
such sharing, lauding the advancement of knowledge made possible only within 
those institutions of higher learning that encouraged their scholars to flourish in their 
research.129 
Nonetheless, it is at least of some note that what was once remarkable judicial 
deference toward higher education and its decisions—a decidedly hands-off 
approach in academic-related cases in the name of academic freedom and the 
advancement of education—has changed as higher education has changed. And it is 
at least interesting that this is precisely what the drafters of the 1915 report suggested 
would occur if an increasing segment of the public became disillusioned with higher 
education: at one point they directly contrasted the dangers of the “university as an 
ordinary business venture, and . . . academic teaching as a purely private 
employment” with the vibrant advancement of knowledge and academic flourishing 
at more typical colleges and universities.130 In short, it was the distinction between, 
in the authors’ words, “private proprietorship and a public trust”131—the distinction 
between business and academia—and that distinction, to their minds, was decidedly 
linked with the protections of academic freedom within institutions that were the 
latter and not the former. 
Their suggestion, therefore, that the university and the persons within it must 
recognize a duty to the public and to public education is worth at least some 
consideration today. 
As one small law-based example of the need for such interaction, today, public 
understanding about the Constitution has declined markedly. The 2015 State of the 
First Amendment report by the Newseum Institute suggests that in just one year, 
from 2014 to 2015, public understanding and knowledge regarding the First 
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Amendment waned in a significant way.132 “[T]hose naming freedom of speech [as 
a part of the First Amendment] decreased from 68 to 57%,” the authors report, and 
“freedom of religion decreased from 29 to 19%, and freedom of the press declined 
from 14 to 10%.”133 There is no guarantee, of course, that greater public engagement 
by law professors who research and write about First Amendment issues could better 
public understanding of the Constitution’s First Amendment guarantees, but it is at 
least possible that if tenure committees valued public service—talks to school groups 
or teacher organizations or publications aimed solely at the general public and not 
fellow scholars—those numbers would be higher and public recognition of 
constitutional rights would be greater.  
Consider too the value that engaged and impartial scientists, engineers, historians, 
and other scholars might add to important and interesting issues making news today, 
and how their voices could inform a public that often learns its lessons from a 
faction-eager media, one, at times, more interested in conflict than in ferreting out 
truth.  
But this public engagement will not happen (and does not happen in most cases) 
if a professor’s academic value is basically solely in scholarly publishing and other 
research unknown to the general public and if tenure review committees see no value 
in public outreach work. Why would anyone on the tenure track choose to spend time 
to travel to inform a teachers’ organization about the Constitution? Why would he or 
she talk with a group of local school children about their legal rights when the number 
of pages of scholarly writing is what is important for tenure or promotion? Why 
would anyone leave campus when service can be performed far more easily inside 
campus walls as a part of committee work? 
My proposal is small. It is not that tenure standards be overhauled or even that 
service be given significantly more weight in tenure decisions in a way that would 
ultimately trump determinations of research or teaching. Research should, in fact, 
remain the cornerstone with teaching a close second. Instead, my proposal is simply 
that tenure committees begin to value public outreach in a way that would meet the 
approval of the authors of the 1915 report: that service should not be known only as 
that portion of the tenure dossier most overlooked, but reviewed more critically and 
methodically by academics who understand that such work ultimately helps support 
the academic freedom that they themselves enjoy. Service, especially service to the 
public through public engagement-type activities, should be supported more 
strongly, both by administrators and by the already-tenured faculty members who 
make up promotion and tenure committees. 
Moreover, as the use of adjunct faculty continues to rise, it seems that colleges 
and universities might do well to hire individuals for full-time teaching, and also 
require of these non-tenure-track instructors service in the form of public outreach. 
This is done in some universities today either more formally or on an ad hoc basis;134 
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sometimes the individual identified as a faculty member in media is not a tenured 
professor at all but an untenured staff member or instructor,135 though the public does 
not know, likely does not care, and values the information either way.  
Skeptical campus administrators, meanwhile, should know that a 2014 Gallup poll 
suggested that 75% of the public believed that the qualifications of the faculty was 
“very important” in determining the quality of a college or university.136 A faculty 
that is engaged with the public helps ensure that the public knows of its 
qualifications, thereby lending, at least in theory, greater support for higher education 
both in terms of tuition dollars and even, perhaps, tax dollars.  
It is true that the 1915 Committee’s three short proposals—three procedure-heavy 
suggestions that come at the end of the report—do not include a direct suggestion 
that faculty members engage in public outreach. But, as the authors suggest, the three 
practical proposals necessarily have at their foundation a conception of academia as 
the committee members described it: that academics have a decided duty to the public 
to share their research more broadly as part of the public trust.137 
CONCLUSION 
In the 2010 report on higher education funded by The National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education and Public Agenda referenced earlier, the authors 
suggested that there is a strong disconnect between leaders in higher education and 
the average American.138 The public, the report suggested, would be decidedly 
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unmoved by administrators’ requests that more tax dollars be shifted toward higher 
education.139 Instead, most Americans believed that colleges could simply increase 
enrollment without compromising quality of instruction and without raising 
tuition.140 If administrators wished to bring the public around to their side in times of 
economic crisis and alleged underfunding of colleges and universities, the report 
suggested, something needed to change: 
Our findings suggest, in other words, that the public may be poised in 
a period of ambivalence and perhaps unpredictability toward the 
financial difficulties of higher education. On the one hand, people 
believe that higher education is important and necessary. But at the 
same time, we find no evidence of sympathy for the argument that 
colleges and universities are starved for financial resources. If higher 
education leaders want to make the argument for a significant 
reinvestment in higher education, they may find that their words fall on 
deaf ears given the public’s current state of mind and that they will 
need to make a more specific and compelling argument to bring more 
Americans to their side.141  
The compelling argument those authors suggest is necessary could be the 
advancement of knowledge that colleges and universities bring through research. But 
without full public understanding of the workings of the institution and precisely 
what knowledge is being generated there by its people—in other words, without 
professors sharing their work more publically in ways meant to inform those outside 
academia’s walls—there is little for the public to point to when it considers the 
reasons to value the work that academics do. 
Similarly and relatedly, there is little for judges to point to when hearing academic 
freedom–based arguments that colleges and universities deserve deference and 
should be treated differently from typical business defendants. After all, today’s 
public perception is that academia cares most about its bottom line to the exclusion 
of education more generally. 
Over a century ago, it appears that the dozen or so academics who helped form 
and guide the budding organization known as the American Association of 
University Professors had at least a partial answer to this problem. They suggested 
that it was part of an academic’s duty to share information and knowledge with the 
general public and that such sharing was decidedly linked with the flourishing and 
advancement of academic freedom.  
The authors of the 1915 report may have been wrong, but perhaps they were right. 
And the only way to be sure is to begin to value more the idea of service, including 
in strong part public engagement and outreach, within higher education at the tenure 
level and otherwise. 
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